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Introduction 
 
The financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that followed it have been attributed 
to a number of causes. Whether these are economic, social, cultural or legal, they are 
all by and large also political. The aim of this paper is not to delve into the myriad 
of heated political arguments that continue to dominate the scene, but to assess the 
impact of the financial crisis on workers’ rights in Greece, Portugal, France and the 
United Kingdom and to examine its impact on their corporate rescue regimes with a 
view to understanding what the legislative and social changes may mean for the 
future of these individual nations, their people and businesses, and perhaps for the 
EU and Eurozone as a whole. In light of the crisis, the rights of the workforce have 
been severely compromised in order to alleviate pressures on troubled companies 
and to afford them a greater potential for recovery. In response to the crisis, all four 
jurisdictions have introduced reforms to their labour codes and corporate rescue 
mechanisms in order to minimise the catastrophic impact on their economies and 
societies.  
As a project, this is only the beginning. This paper will only offer a snap 
shot of those important changes that have occurred since the crisis began, the effects 
as understood at the current level of research, and an initial assessment as to whether 
or not the reforms of the pre-insolvency regimes in particular have operated as an 
effective embankment for the protection of social and economic welfare, the former 
of these being already significantly reduced throughout the EU. While France and 
the UK have had their fair share of economic hardships, Greece and Portugal were 
forced to go to the International Monetary Fund, European Commission and the 
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European Central Bank3 for assistance in order to avoid defaulting on sovereign 
loans, an outcome that would have had a severe effect on financial markets 
throughout the EU. This assistance was granted in exchange for their agreement to 
the terms of Memoranda of Understanding4 that set out measures to be taken to 
improve their economic viability and market flexibility. The austerity measures 
implemented in response to the MoUs have caused great hardship and social turmoil 
in both Greece and Portugal.5 
 
The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Workers Rights 
 
While not every jurisdiction has suffered the same reduction in workers’ rights, 
every country has taken some steps within their labour and employment legal 
systems with a view to improving their economic position by enhancing market 
flexibility. Fundamental changes to working time and atypical employment (albeit 
often temporary) have been made throughout the EU in response to the economic 
crisis. Changes to redundancy rules and industrial relations structures and processes 
have also occurred, often affecting the social dialogue by engaging in measures to 
decentralise collective bargaining. Regardless of whether such changes are 
permanent, they have the effect of undermining the protective role of labour and 
employment law, placing workers in a more precarious position than they would 
have enjoyed prior to the financial and sovereign debt crisis.6 Pensions have also 
been significantly affected by the crisis throughout the EU, which may have lasting 
implications as the working generations move into retirement. Whether due to the 
terms of a MoU or to policy changes to meet the needs of the times, each jurisdiction 
under examination has engaged in a process of reforming labour laws in order to 
increase labour market flexibility in the hopes that this would help to repair national 
economies in crisis.   
 
Greece 
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Greece initially took steps in line with the protective function of labour law during 
at the beginning of the crisis but its perspective changed completely as time has 
passed and its MoU came into effect.7 The financial crisis revealed endemic 
weaknesses in the Greek welfare system and employment regime, in part due to the 
dualist labour market comprised of an official public pool that makes its 
contributions and is protected by the employment laws in place, and a shadow labour 
market that is subject to the precariousness of the poor economic climate and is not 
generally entitled to the same level of social protection. Thus when Greece had to 
resort to the troika for rescue, the austerity measures imposed by the MoU had a 
particularly severe impact on those citizens engaged in the shadow labour market.8 
The overall goals of the MoU were to eliminate fiscal imbalances by achieving fiscal 
surpluses; to improve competitiveness; and to improve liquidity for Greece until its 
return to the financial markets.9  
When the austerity measures were implemented, there was a rapid 
reduction of salaries in the public sector, which were transmitted quickly to the 
private sector, reducing the purchasing power of the Greek people. This in turn 
created a deep and persistent recession, leading to a steep rise in unemployment. 
Greece also had to focus on reducing its debt burden, which diverts public 
expenditure from social benefits, health, education, and welfare provisions. 
Unemployment has continued to rise, and as of October 2014 was hovering at 27%. 
The level and depth of poverty and personal despair has intensified, not the least due 
to the fact that the unemployment fund is based exclusively on contributions, to 
which those who had previously worked in the shadow economy or as undeclared 
workers will not have contributed. The social protection available to ameliorate the 
severe impact of high unemployment is wholly inadequate to the nature of the Greek 
labour market.10 
The structural reforms to labour law specifically were undertaken based on 
the premise that labour market regulation constituted a significant barrier to growth. 
Prior to the crisis, there had been significant resistance to any flexibilisation of the 
labour market through the implementation of laissez-faire policies on collective 
bargaining. By the time of the crisis, Greece had some of the strictest employment 
protection legislation in the EU.11  In counterpoint to Greece’s previously extremely 
employee friendly policies, the austerity policies applied under its MoU are among 
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the most severe in Europe since the end of the Second World War.12 Employment 
remains highly fragile in those economies, such as that of Greece, that have been 
subject to austerity measures and where business restructuring and its effect on job 
security is an ongoing reality.13 
 
i) Wages 
 
The minimum wage has been decreased by approximately 22% for adults and 32% 
for youths under 25.14 Public sector employees have suffered a flat reduction in 
monthly salary as well as holiday and annual leave premiums. Pay is also frozen and 
can no longer be the increased through collective bargaining. Overall, wages have 
decreased by an average of 50% since the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis. 
This is due in part to the decrease in overtime pay, rendering the labour force less 
expensive and more flexible.15 In addition, partial unemployment has been 
introduced as a measure permitting a company to employ employees for a number 
of days less than provided for in their employment contract along with the 
commensurate reduction in pay.16 
 
ii) Atypical Contracts 
 
Changes in the rules governing atypical work contracts have also introduced an 
element of labour flexibility with its associated loss in job security.  Greece has 
changed its rules on fixed term contracts, increasing the maximum term from two to 
three years.17 There is also an increased utilisation of rotational work and fixed term 
contracts in order to increase flexibility. 18 However, Greece has also introduced a 
new scheme for the protection of employees on reduced working hours in medium 
sized companies.19 A number of new kinds of employment contracts have also been 
created that effectively reduce the protection that normal employment would 
provide. For example, a “youth contract” has been introduced through which young 
workers are hired on wages 20% less than the previous rate for first job, with a two 
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year trial period, no social contributions from employers and no entitlement to 
unemployment benefits at the end of the contract.20 
 
iii) Hiring and firing 
 
One of the most significant austerity measure taken in relation to labour market 
flexibility relates to the reduction of the costs of hiring and firing.21 Greek law does 
not require an employer to justify the dismissal of an employee as a potentially fair 
reason, an aspect of its labour code that was in place prior to the crisis. However, 
severance packages were so generous that its labour system was still considered 
highly inflexible. Following the crisis, notification periods were significantly 
reduced thereby reducing the potential amounts of severance compensation, 
therefore reducing the cost of dismissal.22 While justified in the name of 
competitiveness, these changes may also promote the adoption of a short term 
solution for reducing costs via dismissals, rather than pursuing longer term 
strategies, further undermining employment security.23  
 
iv) Redundancy  
 
Collective redundancies, an action often taken when companies fall into financial 
distress, are governed by the Collective Redundancies Directive,24 which stipulates 
information and consultation obligations for employers planning to make a 
minimum of 10 employees in a company with more than 20 employees and 10% in 
establishments with at least 100 employees. Greece’s original implementation was 
far more generous, providing for the Directive’s obligations to apply in cases when 
4 employees were to be dismissed in enterprises of more than 20 employees and 2% 
of employees in enterprises with 150 or more employees. While the law of 2010 
raised this to 6 employees in 20 and 5% in enterprises of more than 150 employees, 
it still remains far more protective than the minimum requirements relative to the 
Directive’s implementation in other member states. However, redundancy pay has 
been reduced by 50%. 25  
 
v) Collective Bargaining 
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The fundamental nature of Greek collective bargaining has changed in the wake of 
the crisis as aspects that had formed part of the industrial character have been wholly 
displaced. The hierarchy of collective agreements has changed; the potency of 
branch level collective agreements has reduced; the extension period for agreements 
following their expiry has been reduced; and mandatory arbitration in the settlement 
of disputes has been abandoned.26 Representation criteria of social partners have 
been reviewed and trade union prerogatives have been extended to other worker 
representation bodies.27 Greece has also placed legal restrictions on the role of 
collective bargaining through the prohibition of wage increases until the 
unemployment rate reduces below 10%.28 There are also ongoing negotiations with 
the troika exploring the possibility of unilaterally limiting the employee right to 
strike. 
 
vi) Access to Social Welfare 
 
Greece has tightened restrictions on the access to social benefits as well as reducing 
the duration and level of payments as a part of their austerity measures. Further, the 
“workfare” employment measure has expanded the use of fixed-term, quasi-
employment in the community and public services, providing a minimum fixed 
income but few employment rights. Under the workfare rules, unemployed youth, 
long term unemployed, and the working poor with low annual incomes are granted 
five months of employment benefit in exchange for working six hours per day in 
community services. These workers replaced the need to hire within the public 
service, which had been frozen under the MoU.29 However, Greece has introduced 
subsidies for employers who recruit unemployed workers.30 
 
Portugal 
 
The labour market in Portugal shares some similarities to that in Greece in that it is 
also of a dual character. A large proportion of workers in large enterprises and the 
public sector enjoyed a high level of employment protection, while those in micro, 
small and medium sized enterprises are less privileged as these companies often do 
not respect employment protection legislation and therefore demonstrate a high level 
of flexibility in hiring and firing. It is this latter labour sector that tends to be the 
hardest hit in times of crisis and explains the rapid rise in unemployment that 
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occurred in similar fashion to Greece, despite the differences in the systems.31 
However, a unique aspect of the Portuguese economy is that its constitutional and 
legal order significantly empowers the more organised segments of the workforce. 
Prior to its bail-out, Portugal had the most rigid employment protection laws in the 
Eurozone.32 Among developed nations it ranked last in terms of labour freedom33 
and it has been asserted that such rigidity has impaired firm performance.34 While 
joining the Euro had the effect of impairing Portugal’s ability to provide cheap 
products to the European market due to the levelling effect of the common currency, 
its highly rigid and protective labour system are also at the root of Portugal’s 
competitiveness problem, but it is also an inherently political issue.35 
Portugal began to feel the pinch of recession shortly after joining the Euro 
due to its low level of competitiveness in the Common Market. It first introduced 
austerity measures in 2005 to combat the depth of recession, and again in 2010. In 
March 2011, in order to avoid a failure requiring the resort to external rescuers, 
additional measures were introduced that would have made cuts to welfare and 
health, as well as freezing pensions, but this was not approved by parliament. Thus 
Portugal also resorted to the troika for help and agreed to its own MoU, 
implementing cuts that went well beyond those suggested therein.36 The 
Memorandum of Understanding specifically targeted several areas in need of labour 
reform: reduction of long term unemployment and strengthening social protections; 
reform of the employment protection legislation in order to combat the segmentation 
of the labour market and to facilitate the movement of workers between professions, 
markets and sectors; improve flexibility of working time rules in order to fit the 
needs of peak business times and thus augment the competitiveness of Portuguese 
businesses; to connect the costs of labour with effective job creation; and   to approve 
legislation that serves to improve the employability of youth and of other 
traditionally disadvantaged categories of workers.37 A new labour code entered into 
force on 1 August 2012 which attempted to integrate the changes required in the 
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MoU, under a flurry of cries against the constitutionality of the reforms, which were 
summarily ignored by the government in power at the time.38 
 
i) Wages  
 
Pay freezes were introduced for public sector workers as were freezes on 
promotions. Salaries were cut by between 3.5 and 10% in 2010. Salary and holiday 
bonuses were abolished.39 In addition, and as a subset of a reduction in wages, the 
Portuguese MoU has had a considerable effect on the reform of working time rules, 
widening overtime options significantly. Previously, employees were paid 50% of 
their hourly wage for the first hour of overtime, 75% for additional hours and 100% 
for work on holidays and Sundays. These rewards have now been reduced by half.40 
In addition, the working week was been increased from 35 to 40 hours for public 
sector workers and extended normal working hours for all employees by two hours 
per day in order to cut overtime costs. Four public holidays have also been 
abolished.41 
 
ii) Hiring and Firing 
 
Prior to the reforms to the labour code, the Portuguese constitution prohibited 
dismissals without a just cause or for political or ideological reasons. Essentially, it 
was impossible to dismiss an employee who had not behaved in an illicit or deviant 
manner having such gravity that it effectively destroyed the employment 
relationship.42 Following the introduction of the new labour code, there has been an 
extension in the concepts of unsuitability and the extinction of worker positions in 
order to make individual dismissals easier. An employer can now establish non-
discriminatory criteria for dismissals, drawing Portugal’s redundancy rules in line 
with what currently exists in the UK. Employers are also no longer obliged to offer 
a transfer to another suitable position when dismissing an employee for either 
unsuitability or the extinction of his job.43 
Portugal has also reduced severance pay for workers from 30 days for every 
year of service with no maximum limit with a three month minimum to 20 days per 
year of service with no minimum severance pay with a cap at 12 months wages or 
240 times the minimum wage. Further reforms have been announced that will bring 
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the Portuguese severance packages into line with EU averages. Probationary periods 
for new employees have also been raised from 3 to 6 months.44 
 
iii)_ Atypical Contracts 
 
Portugal has also rendered the rules on fixed term contracts more flexible by 
increasing the maximum length of a fixed term contract from 6 months to 3 years45 
with the potential to renew twice.46 These changes, in addition to the changes to 
dismissal rules generally, have seen a shift away from indeterminate contracts 
toward fixed term contracts due to the constitutionally imposed difficulties of ending 
indeterminate term contracts,47 rendering job security far more precarious for many 
workers. 
 
iv) Redundancies 
 
Prior to reforms, the system governing collective redundancies in Portugal was rigid 
requiring verification of the reasons for the dismissals and strict formal procedures.48 
More flexible redundancy legislation has been introduced affecting the costs of lay-
offs and other measures to reduce the financial burden on undertakings themselves. 
Eligibility and qualification periods have been amended, providing more scope for 
worker dismissal, and redundancy benefits have been reduced. In addition, Portugal 
has introduced an “employers’ compensation fund” to finance redundancy 
benefits.49 
 
v) Collective Bargaining 
 
Portugal has also undergone amendments to the procedures governing collective 
bargaining aimed at flexibilising existing legislation.50  It has pushed for more firm 
level collective agreements and even individual agreements between employers and 
employees.51 There has been a move toward making it possible for lower level 
bargaining to deviate unfavourably from higher level collective agreements or even 
statutory legislation. The representation criteria of social partners have also been 
reviewed and trade union prerogatives have been extended to other bodies of worker 
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representation.52 Portugal has also made it impossible to bargain for conditions better 
than the new labour code has put into place.53 The overall effect of these moves 
toward decentralisation of trade union operations will serve to weaken trade union 
action and representation at all levels of bargaining. It will also weaken the acquired 
social rights achieved by trade unions at national and local levels throughout the EU, 
lower the standard of recognised rights, and affect fundamental employment 
conditions and social protections.54 
 
vi) Access to Social Welfare 
 
The maximum amount of unemployment insurance has been reduced by a third 
(from three times to only twice the social support index), and the maximum length 
of time the benefit could be paid was reduced from 900 to 540 days.55 However, 
there has also been an increase in the maximum duration of entitlement to non-
contributory social benefit for unemployment schemes.56 
 
France 
The plight of Greece and Portugal are only slightly reflected in the effects that have 
been felt on the welfare states of central Europe, such as France. Many states have 
reformed in ways that reduce entitlements, protection and the welfare of precarious 
or unemployed workers. Temporary working has also become more common, which 
has wide ranging implications for worker equality due to lower employment security 
and earning power. However, while these issues have become common throughout 
the Eurozone and the UK, France’s protection for temporary workers has remained 
the highest in Europe, despite an apparent need to deregulate temporary work in 
order to inject flexibility in the labour market and deal with high unemployment rates 
like the rest of the EU.57 Further, France has introduced additional protections and 
assistance for their unemployed, including subsidised employment contracts and 
extended to new groups of workers a Professional Transition Contract that provides 
intensive help with a job search over a twelve month period, during which a 
beneficiary is also entitled to higher benefit payments.58 
The French banking sector was also not as severely compromised by the 
financial crisis as were the systems of the UK and Germany. This has been in part 
attributed to the way in which France internationalised its banking sector with what 
has been viewed as a more diverse approach with a combination of retail investment 
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as well as corporate lending and investment banking, the latter two of course being 
the cause of much of the banking turmoil that caused the crisis. Although French 
banks were still heavily engaged in market-based banking, they were far smaller 
investors in toxic assets and other high risk activities.59 Throughout the crisis, soft 
forms of protectionism and limited foreign penetration remained features of the 
French banking system while there was only an initial and temporary upswing of 
intervention as a result of the crisis.60 There have, however, been a number of 
changes to the French labour code during this period. 
 
i) Wages 
 
Short time working regimes, which refer to the option of an employer to essentially 
“lay off” employees for a period of time each week or to reduce working hours on a 
daily basis in order to save money for the company regimes, were introduced in 
France as a result of the financial crises.61 These regimes resulted in an overall 
reduction in wage levels throughout the labour market. 
 
ii) Hiring and Firing 
 
The statute of limitations for claims relating to the performance or termination of an 
employment contract has been reduced from five to two years and to three years for 
salary related claims (in stark contrast to the 3 months limitation period in the UK 
for employment tribunal claims!) France has also introduced an enticement to 
engage in alternative dispute resolution by introducing minimal lump sum 
compensation for employees willing to settle at a conciliation hearing before the 
labour court in dismissal cases.62  
 
iii) Redundancies  
 
In May 2013 France passed a Job Security Bill that introduced a number of reforms 
to their labour code relating to the rules governing collective redundancies. The new 
legislation affords employers a greater choice as to the procedure they follow when 
considering collective redundancies in a company of more than 50 employees or 
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more than 10 within 30 days, triggering a job protection plan. Employers are now 
able to negotiate an agreement with a relevant trade union or to unilaterally 
implement a “social plan”, which allows employers to depart significantly from 
standard requirements governing the number of meetings with employee 
representatives, timetables for dismissals, and selection criteria with the aim of 
speeding up the collective consultation process. Works Councils will also be deemed 
to have been consulted even if it fails to respond within a now closed timeline. 
Employers are also now permitted to enter into agreements with trade unions under 
which employees agree to detrimental changes to their terms and conditions in return 
for a commitment by the employer not to implement any redundancies during the 
term of the agreement.63 
France has also added additional protections following the financial crisis. 
It adopted a law specifying that in the event that collective redundancies result in the 
offer of a new post abroad, remuneration must be equivalent to that paid in France. 
Further, the Court of Cassation ruled that contracts terminated by mutual consent for 
economic reasons in the context of a workforce reduction should also be counted 
within the number of intended redundancies, thus counting toward the thresholds of 
collective redundancies, which may then indicate the requirement for an 
employment safeguard plan to be put in place. Termination by mutual agreement can 
therefore not be used to circumvent the protections in place for employees subject to 
redundancy.64  
 
iv) Access to Social Welfare 
 
France has extended the maximum duration of compensated partial or technical 
unemployment and increased its compensation rates for the same. In addition, it has 
made it easier to access the benefit system for those with short working records.65 
France has also extended its unemployment insurance agreement to better benefit 
the most precarious workers by reducing the minimum contribution period for 
unemployment insurance entitlement from four to six months. In addition, France is 
offering one off 500 Euro payments for young people who lack a substantial work 
history. Finally, the Professional Transition Contract has now been extended to 
workers in companies of all sizes and offers 80% replacement of previous gross 
salary and intensive job-seeking assistance for a year to those workers who have 
been made redundant for economic reasons.66 
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v) Collective Bargaining 
 
There has been a move toward making it possible for lower level bargaining to 
deviate unfavourably from higher level collective agreements or even statutory 
legislation.67 Thus France is also taking small steps toward the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining. 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
While the UK experienced a sudden economic shock in terms of bankruptcies, 
decrease in consumer demand, drops in gross domestic product growth and an 
increase in unemployment, it differs from France, Greece and Portugal in several 
significant ways. It is not part of the Single Monetary Union, it follows a liberal 
approach to the economy and a light touch to any kind of interventionist regulation,68 
which was only enhanced through deregulation as a result of the economic crisis, 
and its financial structure is highly internationalised. As a result of this latter 
characteristic, it was one of the first European countries to be heavily hit by the 
global crisis, due to its strong ties with the financial sector of the United States.69 
In terms of social and unemployment problems precipitated by the financial 
crisis, Britain has taken a distinctly laissez-faire approach, being unwilling to 
improve, even temporarily, the already relatively low support provided in 
unemployment. The UK’s approach to tackling the crisis has been characterised 
mostly by tax cuts in an attempt to boost economic activity while nothing has been 
done to address those who are becoming unemployed, differing significantly in 
approach to the rest of Western Europe.70 In addition, the UK has proceeded to 
deregulate the labour market in a number of areas, including discrimination and 
equality. It has repealed provisions in the Equality Act 2010 relating to combined 
protective characteristics and third party harassment on the grounds that they are 
perceived as burdens on business. The duty on public authorities to have regard to 
the need to reduce socio-economic inequalities has been repealed (though it also 
never entered into force) and the duty on large employers to publish details of the 
gender pay gap is not being implemented.71   
The UK has also implemented a new employee-shareholder status in which 
employees can agree in exchange for shares with a minimum value of £2000 in the 
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employer company to waive certain employment rights such as the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed, the right to statutory redundancy pay, entitlement to request 
flexible working except in limited circumstances, and the entitlement to request 
training or study. Employee-shareholders are also subject to longer notice periods 
before returning from maternity or paternity leave. While the waiver of employment 
rights does not preclude claims relating to discrimination and employees are required 
to take independent legal advice, entitled to a detailed statement of terms and subject 
to a seven day cooling off period, the implications of this new form of contract 
essentially undermines the cornerstone of UK employment law: the employment 
contract.72 It is yet to be seen what effect this new status may have on the equality in 
the employment relationship, bargaining power and the relative security of 
employment.  
While most countries have taken action in relation to benefits for the 
unemployed affected by the financial crisis, Britain has taken a decidedly apathetic 
approach. It had the least supportive system for the unemployed prior to the crisis 
and has proved to be the most reluctant government to improve its policies in the 
light of the economic conditions of the crisis. Instead, Britain has introduced 
employment subsidy schemes to benefit employers hiring the long term unemployed 
and focussed on other means of activating the unemployed in the country.73 
 
i) Wages 
 
The lack of intervention by the UK government led to the involvement of social 
partners in entering into collective agreements that reduced working hours and 
wages in order to save jobs, though in many cases massive redundancies were still 
unavoidable. The median pay settlement dropped and occupational pensions have 
been cut.74 
 
ii) Atypical Contracts 
 
Zero-hours contracts have become in common usage in the UK. These contracts 
mean that there is no obligation on the employer to provide work or for workers to 
accept it, but it also often means that employees are not permitted to work for another 
employer at the same time, leaving them in a precarious financial position. While a 
flexible workforce is one of the reasons cited for the UK pulling away from France 
and the rest of the Eurozone in terms of GDP growth, but the zero hours contract 
may also be creating a low-wage underclass to be summoned peremptorily by 
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employers on a whim in a repeat in what might be recognised as a Victorian style 
industrial relationship.75 
 
iii) Hiring and Firing 
 
In the UK, unfair dismissal rules have been substantially changed. Employees must 
now work for a minimum of two years continuous service to qualify to claim unfair 
dismissal at an Employment Tribunal. Compensation has also been restricted to the 
lower of a specified amount not exceeding three times the median annual earnings 
of an employee or a specified number of not less than 52 weeks multiplied by a 
weeks’ pay of the employee.76 
 
iv) Redundancy and Acquired Rights 
 
The global economic crisis has inevitably led to redundancies in the workplace, 
particularly relevant in those jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, that have 
relatively weak protections in place against collective dismissals. 77  The UK has 
undertaken to comply only minimally with EU obligations for worker protective 
obligations. Conditions governing economic dismissals have been softened and 
thresholds loosened in order to increase labour market flexibility, making it easier 
for businesses to lay off workers. 78 In particular, it has reduced the consultation 
period for collective dismissals from 90 to 45 days for redundancies of more than 
100 employees (the EU minimum is 30 days) and now excludes fixed term contracts 
that have reached their agreed termination date from collective redundancy 
obligations.79 There have also been reduced protections under the TUPE 
regulations80: contractual conditions can now be more easily altered if the changes 
are connected with the transfer but are for an economic, technical or organisational 
reason entailing changes in the workforce; dismissals are no longer automatically 
unfair for changes in workplace; collective agreements can be renegotiated a year 
after the transfer; and it is now more difficult to satisfy the criteria of a service 
provision change (the work must be fundamentally the same).81  
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v) Access to Social Welfare 
 
In Britain there has been a nearly complete absence of any improvement in income 
support measures.82 In fact, it has become increasingly difficult for the most 
vulnerable in society to access social benefits associated with loss of employment 
and disability. 
 
vi) Access to Justice 
 
The UK has had a highly flexible labour market in comparison to the rest of the EU 
member states for decades. However, it could be said that the financial crisis and its 
effects on labour markets throughout the EU has provided an opportunity to further 
reduce employment rights through deregulation. Most significant perhaps is the fact 
that the UK has made it more difficult for employees to access justice for unfair 
dismissal and indeed any other employment related claim by instituting fees for 
employment tribunals and appeals. The introduction of tribunal fees affects not only 
unfair dismissal claims, but those relating to discrimination and other socially 
important aspects of employment law.83 
 
Impact of Financial Crisis on Rescue Regimes 
 
There have been a number of reforms to insolvency and corporate rescue throughout 
the EU in the early 2000’s and then just following the financial crisis with aims of 
supporting a rescue culture, though the various regimes under examination here have 
found themselves at different depths along the stream of rehabilitation and recovery. 
These regimes have operated with varied success as an effective embankment for 
the protection of failing businesses and the social and economic welfare associated 
with them. For the purpose of this paper, the focus of attention will be on pre-
insolvency rescue procedures. 
 
Greece 
 
Prior to the reforms of 2007, Greece lacked any kind of sophisticated corporate 
rescue regime. Rather its insolvency system was geared toward liquidation and has 
historically resembled the French insolvency system. Rehabilitation under the old 
system was only theoretically possible through a settlement of debts between the 
debtor company and its creditors by way of a voluntary reorganisation through a 
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direct creditors’ agreement, though this method did not provide for a “cram-down”84 
on dissenting creditors. 85 
The 2007 Insolvency Law86 aimed to update an outdated system by 
introducing radical changes to the Greek insolvency philosophy, providing for the 
rescue of ailing companies and offering a second chance to insolvent debtors. It 
provided for quick and easy access to rehabilitation procedures such as conciliation 
and was primarily designed to ensure the rescue of viable distressed companies and 
preservation of employment. Conciliation was a debtor in possession procedure 
similar to the French conciliation procedure. A debtor in financial difficulties would 
apply to the court to appoint a conciliator with the task of achieving an agreement 
between the debtor company and its creditors in order to overcome the company’s 
financial distress and safeguard its survival.87 The debtor would then be immune to 
individual enforcement for a period of two years while the reorganisation plan was 
being implemented. However, the conciliation proceeding proved inadequate to the 
task due to its consensual basis and lack of cram-down. The requirement to appoint 
a conciliator or mediator also led to a lengthy process that made it impossible to 
bring the parties to agreement quickly. In addition, the conciliation procedure has 
been abused by debtors as a means of securing a preliminary order prohibiting 
creditors from enforcing their claims.88 
In 2011, a new law was passed that replaced conciliation with 
rehabilitation. This revised procedure allows a debtor to obtain the ratification of a 
restructuring plan agreed with the requisite majority of creditors without any other 
judicial assistance or protection. The debtor can also submit an application for the 
opening of negotiations with creditors in which it can seek the appointment of a 
mediator to facilitate negotiations or it can seek to negotiate directly with a creditors’ 
committee, or on a bilateral basis where a qualified majority of creditors negotiate 
directly with the debtor company.  This procedure is technically pre-bankruptcy, but 
a company must show that it is in a state of financial weakness. A moratorium can 
also be put into place through a preliminary order by the court after an application 
for rehabilitation proceedings has been received.89 
While the new rehabilitation procedure is a clear improvement over the 
conciliation procedure, it also has serious obstacles to overcome in order for it to 
make any significant contribution to rescuing companies, saving jobs and 
maximising value for the financially distressed debtor company’s stakeholders 
overall. Access to the procedure is draconian, restricted to companies just on the 
verge of insolvency and that have perhaps already gone too far down the river to be 
rescued. The process is also still overly dependent on the Greek judicial system. 
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While a pre-pack style of procedure is available in Greece, it requires a number of 
months and contested hearings under Greek procedural requirements. Greek 
business culture is also an issue given that the success of a rescue proceeding 
depends on a residual trust and good faith among the debtor and its stakeholders. 
Greek business culture tends to be suspicious of these processes, viewing them as a 
prelude to default and often precipitating damaging responses from suppliers and 
banks. The abuse of the previous system does not help in this negative view.90 
 
Portugal 
 
Rescue proceedings in Portugal are available in the Insolvency Plan, an out of court 
proceeding similar in form to the German Insolvenzplan as set out in the Insolvency 
and Enterprise Rescue Code91 in 2004. The purpose of this procedure is either to 
liquidate an insolvent debtor’s assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors or to 
satisfy creditor debt in a manner envisaged in an insolvency plan based on the 
recovery of the company. However this plan was available only available if the 
company was indeed insolvent, thus not technically a pre-insolvency rescue 
procedure.92 
The Portuguese MoU required that reforms be instated that better facilitate 
the rescue of viable firms, including fast-tracking court approval procedures for 
restructuring plans. Thus Portuguese legislators introduced reforms in 2012 that 
added a new hybrid proceeding to the insolvency plan aimed only at pre-insolvency 
situations, the special revitalisation proceeding.  It is available to those companies 
that are facing economic difficulties or are in an imminent insolvency situation. The 
procedure is comprised of a period of negotiations between the company and its 
creditors with the aim of agreeing to a restructuring plan. Once agreed by a 
qualifying majority of creditors and approved by the court, the plan becomes binding 
upon all creditors, whether dissenting or not.93  Since its implementation, the new 
revitalisation procedure has seemed popular among a number of different debtors, 
company and individual alike.94 
There are, however, certain weaknesses in this new procedure. While it is 
advantageous that the restructuring can now be carried out without the company 
being declared insolvent, in the event that negotiations do not arrive at an equitable 
solution, the company then risks being declared insolvent and subject to the opening 
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of insolvency proceedings.95 Part of the problem here is that, like Greece, there is a 
cultural suspicion of debt and insolvency. If the debtor is unable to satisfy the 
creditors that any compromises made will be worth the result, those creditors might 
well initiate insolvency proceedings in order to protect themselves from what they 
may view as an untenable or even unscrupulous process. The 2012 reforms did, 
however, make changes to the requirements for classification in insolvency, which 
had before been associated with the finding of guilt for those causing the financial 
troubles. It is now no longer compulsory to register for classification unless there is 
evidence of intentional or grossly negligent conduct by the company directors.96 
The 2012 amendments did not, however, provide any reformative measures 
for the insolvency plan, despite the undisputed flaws in the regime. Thus it remains 
equally difficult for insolvent companies, even though still viable, to escape 
liquidation. The absence of amendments to the insolvency plan, in addition to the 
shortening of the term to file for insolvency, make a company’s position under 
Portuguese insolvency law that much more pressured rather than alleviating the 
stress.97 Where difficulties for businesses are encountered, so too are risks for 
employees. 
 
France 
 
France might be considered the inventor of the concept of corporate rescue, 
beginning in 1967 even prior to the legendary Chapter 11 procedure of the United 
States that many systems now try to emulate. In the 1990s the mandataire ad hoc and 
the amicable settlement provided preventative pre-insolvency procedures. The Law 
of 200598 revised the ad hoc mandate and replaced the amicable settlement with 
conciliation. The conciliation procedure is a type of mediation open to businesses in 
foreseeable or acknowledged difficulty as well as those already in a state of cessation 
of payments. The procedure gives creditors the opportunity to agree a legally binding 
agreement with the debtor company.99 The Law of 2005 also introduced the 
procedure of sauvegarde (preservation) as an up-stream option to the conciliation 
and ad hoc procedures, aimed at early intervention in a failing company. However, 
and without leaving much time for the new procedure to become integrated into 
practical usage, its perceived underutilisation led to a reform in 2008. The ordinance 
of 2008100 made major changes to all of the procedures contained within the French 
                                                          
95 C. Serra, “The Rescue of Large Corporations-How Suitable is the Portuguese Insolvency Act?” op. 
cit., at 97-99. 
96 C. Serra, “Country Reports: Portugal – the New Portuguese Insolvency Act” (2012) 47 EuroFenix – 
The Journal of INSOL Europe, pp. 40. 
97 C. Serra, “Amendments to the Portuguese Insolvency Act – Much ado about nothing?” (2012)   49 
EuroFenix – The Journal of INSOL Europe, pp. 14-17. 
98 Law No. 2005-845 of 26 July 2005. 
99 J. R. Silkenat and C. D. Schmerler, The Law of International Insolvencies and Debt Restructurings 
(2006, Oceana Publications, United States), at 146-150. 
100 Ordinance no. 2008-1345 of 18 December 2008. 
insolvency system. The bulk of its provisions addressed the perceived deficiencies 
of the sauvegarde procedure.101  
The global financial crisis also led to changes in practice that prompted 
further reforms in the Law of 2010,102 introducing a French style of pre-pack in a 
new procedure called the sauvegarde financière accélérée (accelerated financial 
preservation). Designed mainly for larger companies, it allowed a company 
undergoing conciliation to enter into the sauvegarde if they had a plan that they could 
convince the court would assure the continuation of the business and command the 
support of a majority of creditors. These procedures, out of the range available 
among the four jurisdictions under study in this paper, appear to be the most 
advanced, up-stream, pre-insolvency procedures available, perhaps throughout the 
whole of the EU. However, the continued impact of the financial crisis, the impact 
of the Eurozone crisis, concerns about the continued viability of French businesses 
and chronic underemployment has led to yet another set of reforms in 2014. This 
was preceded by a review and a report on the state of insolvency that stated that the 
principal objectives for any reform would be to facilitate the anticipation of 
worsening economic conditions by businesses, to reinforce the efficiency of 
procedures by adjusting the impact to creditors, debtors and others, to adapt to the 
prevailing reality of the treatment of businesses in an irremediable and compromised 
situation while at the same time respecting the relative rights of creditors and debtors 
as well as to ensure greater security, simplicity and effectiveness.103 The result was 
an Ordinance of 2014104 that introduced two new procedures: sauvegarde financière 
and the rétablissement professionnel, both of which are dependent upon another 
procedure previously being engaged. The former is a variation on the sauvegarde 
theme as an agreement among the principal creditors and the debtor and contains a 
cram-down element while the latter deals with impecunious estates. The sauvegarde 
financière has the advantage of speed and efficiency in terms of not losing business 
value and is intended not to affect employees at all.105 
While the frequency of reform in France is great and perhaps, due to that 
fact, confusing, it also shows a willingness to change with the time in such a way as 
to keep improving the effectiveness of corporate rescue processes. France’s inherent 
concern for its workers is also supported by the constant improvement of corporate 
rescue as this inevitably assists in maintaining a higher level of job security, which 
is a stated objective of the French rescue culture.  
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United Kingdom 
 
The most significant reforms to insolvency law in the United Kingdom in the recent 
past occurred five years before the beginning of the crisis with the Insolvency Act 
2000106 Enterprise Act 2002, both of which came into force on 2 November 2002.107  
These acts modified the Insolvency Act 1986 by replacing certain of its provisions 
with new sections and schedules aimed at improving rescue procedures in terms of 
efficiency, benefit and practical use. The 2000 Act reformed the Company Voluntary 
Arrangements, a pre-insolvency procedure which now allows for a moratorium, 
while the 2002 Act reforms the administration procedures. The latter of theses has 
arguably had the most significant effect on the UK rescue culture as it went further 
to protect unsecured creditors, streamlined the procedures, and was implemented 
despite the resistance of banks, financial institutions and other primary lenders who 
had benefitted from the exclusive control that administrative receivership had 
allowed.108 The new procedure presents three hierarchical objectives: to first try to 
rescue the company as a going concern, or if not to achieve a better result than would 
be achieved in liquidation. Finally, if the first two options were unattainable, seek to 
realise property in order to make distributions to secured or preferential creditors.109 
It is not, however, a pre-insolvency procedure in its purely statutory form. 
The pre-pack, however, does function as a pre-insolvency type of 
mechanism, though it is a non statutory practice led process that functions on the 
premise of a pre-packaged sale by an administrator on terms that have been agreed 
before the administration is commenced, but which is carried out shortly after the 
appointment of an administrator.110 This process avoids the disruption to business 
common in normal insolvency procedures and also reduces the potential reputational 
damage due to its secretive nature. While the secretive nature of pre-packs have 
come under scrutiny in recent years, particularly with regard to their effects on 
employment protection in these satiations, they are still commonly used and an 
important element of the UK’s pre-insolvency procedures.111 While true that UK 
case law has said that TUPE would apply to transfers occurring out of pre-pack 
administrations,112 in practice this has not been a particularly serious issue  due to 
the way that pre-packs are used: mainly as a tool for debt restructuring.113 
                                                          
106 Insolvency Act 2000,  c. 39. 
107 Enterprise Act 2002,  c.40. 
108 The Enterprise Act 2002 also abolished administrative receivership which was a procedure that could 
be initiated by a floating charge holder holding security over all or most of the company’s assets 
through which it could appoint an administrative receiver to act on their behalf to exercise their security 
rights, putting them in control of the company assets and generally leading to liquidation and low to no 
returns for other creditors. 
109 P. Omar and J. L. L. Gant, “Corporate Rescue in the UK: Ten Years after the Enterprise Act 2002 
Reforms”, (2014) (forthcoming). 
110 D. Ereira, “UK Restructuring and Insolvency Law: Current and Future Trends”, (2010) April 
Practical Law Publishing Limited, pp. 23-29.  
111 K. Creighton-Selvay, “Pre-packed Administration: an Empirical Social Rights Analysis”, (2013) 
42(2) Industrial Law Journal, pp. 85-121, at 88. 
112 See Key2Law v De’Antiquis & Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 1567. 
113 K. Creighton-Selvay, op. cit, at 112. 
The Company Voluntary Arrangement is another pre-insolvency 
mechanism that is sometimes used on its own and sometimes in conjunction with an 
administration or a pre-pack procedure. The purpose of the CVA is to avoid a formal 
insolvency procedure that would otherwise consume the assets of the company. As 
a debtor friendly procedure, it also encouraged companies to seek help at an earlier 
stage of their difficulties.114 In addition to this, the Scheme of Arrangement,115 
although not technically within the remit of the insolvency regime, provides another 
mechanism through which companies can deal with their financial problems at an 
earlier stage. Thus there are a number of options for up-stream pre-insolvency 
procedures in the UK, providing a means of preserving business and, by association, 
employment. However, the employment protection regime in the UK does not 
provide a high level of protection that can be depended upon in insolvency situations.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Employment protection and corporate rescue reforms differ in their fundamental 
functions, but are both important aspects of a healthy economy. Excessive 
inequalities in terms of wages and productivity have been said to be at the root and 
economic recessions and depressions during the modern era. Such imbalances 
heighten the risk of economic failure. A growing wage and productivity gap upsets 
the natural mechanisms necessary to achieve economic balance. Where wages fall, 
so too does consumption, leading to deflation where demand is not supported.116 
This also applies to the economic benefit of unemployment insurance as this helps 
to stabilise consumer demand in the face of economic downturns, which would 
otherwise be sapped by rising unemployment.117  
While employment protection and other socially oriented regulation 
provide an important safety net for employees who are in an inherently less powerful 
bargaining position than employers generally, the financial crisis has seen these 
measures reduce in strength throughout the EU, except exceptionally perhaps for 
France. As these measures reduce in strength, employee rights in insolvency also fall 
behind as redundancy, dismissal, collective agreements and transfer of undertakings 
are often implicated in insolvency and rescue processes. If one looks at corporate 
rescue not only as a means of preserving economically viable businesses, but also as 
a part of the social aims of employment protection, there arises an additional reason 
to ensure that corporate rescue processes are effective: the protection of the 
employees. The rescue culture might provide another level of employment 
protection, an embankment against the ravages of economic recession and crisis, in 
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which an effective rescue system might help to alleviate some of the severity of the 
effects that the financial and sovereign debt crisis have had on the rights and security 
of employees and workers.   
 
 
 
 
